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1.  Introduction 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has encountered rough times before, but never 
has its power over the world oil market been in question as it is today.  Along with the global recession, and 
following the tragedy of September 11
th
, there has been a noticeable shift in the priorities and objectives of both 
OPEC
1
 and non-OPEC members.  As a result, OPEC’s once dominant position in world oil markets appears to be 
weakening. 
 
World oil prices have reached a two-year low, yet OPEC has been unable to do much about the decline.  In 
spite of a reduction of 1.7 million barrels in daily oil production, OPEC has thus far been unable to bolster softening 
oil prices.   
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, below, projections of growth in world oil demand are more than equaled by 
growth projections in non-OPEC oil production.   Such projections would argue for relatively flat oil prices through 
2002. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: Energy Information Agency, OPEC fact sheet, December 6th, 2001  
found http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html 
 
In the past, OPEC was able to rely on non-OPEC members, particularly Russia, for support in reducing 
production and increasing oil prices.   The days of Russia’s support of OPEC policies, however, appear to be coming 
to an end.   
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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As the second-largest oil producer in the world, Russia appears intent on distancing itself from association 
with the OPEC cartel.  This appears especially true following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and given 
Russia’s new role with the coalition in the war in Afghanistan.  
 
In a recent request by OPEC for approximately 500,000 barrels of oil per day to be taken off the world 
market, Russia responded with a reduction of only 30,000 barrels per day.  This relatively meager response by 
Russia, while saving face diplomatically with its OPEC friends, also opens a diplomatic door to the U.S. oil market.  
There is speculation that the U.S. will one day turn away from Saudi Arabia and towards Russia for its oil needs.
2
   
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, below, OPEC’s world market share has fallen to the range of 40%. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: Energy Information Agency, OPEC fact sheet, December 6th, 2001 
found http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html 
 
 
For this to happen though, we need to stress that Russian would need a large of capital inflow into its oil 
sector as well as U.S. technology to help it sustain a high oil production rate.  Russia’s oil wells are known to be in 
need of repair and U.S. technology can go a long way in restoring the high daily production rates that the country 
use to achieve. 
 
As a cartel, OPEC oil producers have at times acted in unison; that is, as a single oil producer, in achieving 
oil production and pricing goals.  Such cohesion is difficult to enforce and maintain.  Currently, for example, there 
appears to be general agreement among OPEC members on the goal of increasing oil prices, and the need for 
reducing production in order to do so.  While OPEC members have agreed in principle to reduced production 
quotas, the reality of this situation is far different. 
 
Figure 3, below, clearly shows OPEC’s basic problem and dilemma.  Cartels rarely succeed in enforcing discipline 
within their ranks and thus cheating takes place.  As Figure 3 clearly demonstrates, OPEC has been unable to stick 
to its own oil production decisions, and thus ends up over producing.   
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Figure 3 
Source: Energy Information Agency, OPEC fact sheet, December 6th, 2001 
found http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html 
 
 
This overproduction by OPEC further adds to a softening of oil prices.  In addition, OPEC’s inability to cut 
it’s own production makes non-OPEC countries less likely to go along with OPEC requests for production cuts.   
 
Given the global recession and the decline in travel both in the United States and overseas following the 
September 11 attacks, overall demand for oil is headed down, pointing to further decline in oil prices.  With little or 
no help from the non-OPEC group, there appears little OPEC can do to prevent further oil price drops.   
 
____________________ 
Endnotes 
 
1
 Or least some from within like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states.  It is difficult for them to argue 
for an increase in oil prices given the new circumstances (both economic and in light of the tragic events of 
September 11
th
.)  This, however, has not stopped Saudi Arabia from asking some non-OPEC members to join 
them in reducing output but this has not been met with overwhelming support from the Non-OPEC group. 
2
 For this to happen, though, we need to stress that Russian would need a large of capital inflow into its oil sector 
as well as U.S. technology to help it sustain a high oil production rate.  Russia’s oil wells are known to be in 
need of repair and U.S. technology can go a long way in restoring the high daily production rates that the 
country use to achieve. 
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